Latin America is seeing growing military activity by the United States. Under the umbrella of the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), launched by President Donald Trump in March, US forces are carrying out strikes on vessels suspected of drug trafficking, while US officials are deepening ties and cooperation with Latin American militaries. This reflects the growing push from Washington towards militarisation of the region, as left-wing politics decline. For Latin America, this may spell the return of coercive US policies.
The projection of US military power, whether through coordinated operations, US boots on the ground or the use of regional bases, will not help improve regional security and fight crime. If anything, it could undermine democracy and usher in more violence and instability. Apart from the US, the ACCC includes 17 Latin American and Caribbean nations: Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala, Paraguay, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Peru. Although Venezuela is not officially part of the coalition, it appears it has opened up its territory for US operations.
With its informal participation, the ACCC is able to complete the “Andean arc”, which accounts for the entirety of the cocaine production distributed and sold in the US and Europe. This is also where many of the region’s organised crime groups operate. But the coalition appears to be about more than just narcotics. Trump has said that the ACCC’s mandate is to counter “malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere” – a veiled reference to China.
The fact that the ACCC was created in Florida just two months after the US army had carried out a ground operation in Venezuela and deposed its president, Nicolas Maduro, was also significant. Another step in that direction came on August 4 , when the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) announced the creation of the Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force, which will “synchronise U.S. military operations with allies and partners to counter threats, strengthen regional security and respond rapidly to crises across the Western Hemisphere”. The new task force will integrate command and control of the 18 members of the ACCC. Washington is clearly seeking to reassert coercive hegemony over the region.
It wants to exert greater influence and control over security and defence decisions in the region, in what appears to be a resurrection of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, now renamed the Trump Corollary. Recent operations in the region have shed light on what a renewed US force projection might look like. In June, Trump revealed on Truth Social that the US army, acting in coordination with Venezuelan authorities, carried out an air strike targeting Hector Guerrero Flores, leader of the criminal gang, Tren de Aragua, in Bolivar state. In a statement, the Venezuelan government later acknowledged the joint action by both countries.
In late August and early September, the newly created Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force attacked several suspected vessels, killing at least two people. This was a continuation of the “Southern Spear” operation, which to date has killed at least 220 people with no investigation launched into whether they were all indeed involved in drug trafficking. Added to this is the announcement made by Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, that newly inaugurated Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella has authorised the US to conduct military operations in Colombia “to combat narco-terrorism”. All of this means, the US is seeking greater military reach in Latin America, whether in the form of bilateral cooperation through joint operations or unilateral action involving overflights of the countries’ territories and even access to national military bases.
There will likely be US troops on the ground involved in operations to neutralise whatever activities the US perceives as a threat. Latin America is not new to US military intervention. During the Cold War, Washington was extensively involved in mostly covert activity in the region, but there were also overt operations, such as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and of the island nation of Grenada. In many cases, the civilian population faced violence as a result of the US interventions.
After the Cold War, US involvement took the shape of anti-drug campaigns, which similarly did not produce positive outcomes for local communities. Take the example of Plan Colombia (2000-2015), which was meant to combat drug trafficking and leftist insurgent groups. Although it contributed to the weakening of insurgent organisations, it also produced a lot of violence, including by the US-trained Colombian military, which was accused of killing thousands of civilians and claiming they were rebels to “show results”. US troops stationed in Colombia as part of training programmes were also accused of raping dozens of Colombian women and girls and smuggling drugs and weapons.
Plan Colombia, which received $10bn in US funding, ended up militarising Colombia’s security agenda, intensifying armed conflicts and cartel violence, as well as the persecution of union leaders, peasants and the civilian population. It failed to stop the proliferation of coca plantations. Given the past historical record, the US push for the militarisation of Latin American states and a greater military presence in the region is unlikely to bring more security. The effect of greater US military engagement in the region will not be limited to the security sector only.
Washington has made clear that membership in the ACCC should translate into greater national spending on defence. That means national budgets will be thrown out of balance and resources will be diverted away from vital sectors such as education, health care, housing and social security. Worsening social services provision will likely lead to more public discontent. Then there is the question of sovereignty.
The US will seek to influence the design of security and defence policies—particularly with regard to maintaining internal security and the scope of military cooperation. Washington can and will put pressure on governments and legislatures to align with its agenda. The fact that US officials have insisted that ACCC member countries withdraw from the International Criminal Court does not bode well for transparency and accountability. Clearly, the aim is to ensure impunity for US armed forces and their allies.
It is highly likely that a lack of transparency and accountability will exacerbate the authoritarian trend that has been emerging in Latin American politics, with well-known consequences: weakening of institutions, increased discretionary power, the erosion of the rule of law, and, consequently, a decline in citizens’ quality of life. For the Trump administration, the ACCC may be an important foreign policy win. But for Latin American societies, it is yet another threat to their fragile democratic institutions. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
